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The proliferation of ethnic militia and their activities in Nigeria, particularly 
in the Niger Delta region has moved from the closing of flow stations to 
kidnapping for ransom.  The aim of these militia groups have changed from 
asking for fairness and equity in the distribution of the wealth of the Nigerian 
state into a serious form of criminality especially the kidnapping of indigenes 
and expatriates for ransom. The activities of these groups have adverse 
economic and security implications for the region and the nation at large.  It 
is against this background that this paper examined the activities of ethnic 
militia and the consequences of their activities for the Niger Delta Region.  
Finally, the paper proffered solutions to the continuing crisis of militancy in 
the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. 
 
Introduction 
In Nigeria, ethnic and religious groups have taken the centre stage and play 
prominent roles in the dynamics of governance of the Nigerian state. Ethnic, 
socio-political formations like the Ohaneze Ndigbo, Arewa Consultative 
Forum and the Afenifere are the most visible on the political arena.  These 
groups have a penetrating influence.  They, particularly at the youth leve, are 
called ethnic militias, though the agenda and activities of these groups, i.e the 
militias and the ethnic socio-political groups may not necessarily be related.  
The most prominent of the ethnic militias include Oodua Peoples Congress 
(OPC), Egbesu Boys of Africa (EBA), Movement for the Sovereign State of 
Biafra (MASSOB), Niger Delta People Volunteer Force (NDPVF), 
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Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), Arewa Peoples 
Congress (APC) and religious militia groups in Northern Nigeria.  As already 
stated, these movements, seeking to protect and advance different ethnic 
interests, are now contesting not just the political space and democratic 
dividends, but also resource control as part of the liberation of the political 
environment. (Agbu, O. 2002).These groups, who claim to represent ethnic 
and regional interests, adopt diverse strategies which include violence and 
criminally motivated actions in the conduct of their activities. 
 
There are, however, different opinions on how to tackle the problems 
emanating from the actions of these groups.  Some argue that the activities of 
these militia groups are a way of demanding for fairness and equity in the 
distribution of the wealth of the nation, the bulk of which they believe comes 
from the region. These groups see the activities of ethnic militia as 
manifestations and frustrations expressed as a result of the dysfunction in the 
structure and character of the Nigerian state. The solution for this group lies 
in addressing the national question, particularly as it affects the Niger Delta 
region.   Others see the activities of the militia groups particularly in the 
Niger Delta region, as an act of criminality. The solution for this group is that 
since this is purely a security issue, the state must deploy its coercive 
machinery to put these criminal activities under some meaningful control. 
 
A plethoral of these groups has emerged from all the geo-political zones of 
the country, but are more pronounced in number and activities in the Niger 
Delta.  One of the implications of the activities of the groups is the 
proliferation of small arms and weapons.  This has led to an increase in 
criminal activities in the region with profound security implications. 
 
It is against this background that the paper examined the phenomenon of 
ethnic militias in the Nigerian context with particular reference to the Niger 
Delta region. The paper also examined criminality in the Niger Delta and also 
proffered solutions on how to address the activities of militia groups which, 
some argued, presently constitute a threat to the survival of the Nigerian 
state. 
 
Conceptualizing Ethnic Militia in Nigeria 
Duverger, M. (1976) sees militia as a  
a kind of private army whose members are enrolled on 
military lives, one subjected to the same discipline and 
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same training as soldiers, like them wearing uniforms and 
badges, heady by a band and flags and like them ready to 
meet, the enemy with weapons in physical combat 
 
He noted further that militia groups vary significantly from regular armies, 
because members of these militia groups remain civilians without military 
culture.  Furthermore, they may be obliged to meet and train regularly and be 
ready to hold themselves at the disposition of their leaders. 
 
They are never mobilized on a permanent basis and also not maintained full 
time by their organization. Moreover he noted that two categories are 
distinguishable among the militia, namely those who may be referred to as a 
kind of “active army”, who are ever ready for confrontation and others who 
are described more or less like “reserve”. Furthermore, he observed that the 
military character of the militia appear not only in its composition but also in 
its structure, which is usually “based on very small groups which build up 
into pyramids to form larger and larger units (Duverger, 1976). 
 
An ethnic militia movement can be described as an extreme form of ethnic 
agitation for self determination as various ethnic groups assume militant 
postures and gradually metamorphose into militia groups which rely on 
ethnic identity and purport to act as machinery through which the desires of 
the people are actualized. The common characteristics of these ethnically 
inspired groups are 
• the resort to violence, 
• a preponderance of youth membership, 
• an ethnic identity affiliation. 
 
From the foregoing explanations and definitions, an ethnic militia can be 
described as youth organization formed for the struggle against deprivation 
and marginalization which have transformed into violent militant youth some 
of who, have also changed their objectives from struggles for ethnic desires 
into criminal activities. 
 
Ethnic Militias in the Niger Delta 
The emergence and growth of militia groups in contemporary Nigeria can be 
traced to the internal contradictions in the Nigerian political economy. First, 
is the nature of the Nigerian state which has been a violent one and has 
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striven to maintain control and dominance of the society through violent 
approaches. 
 
Militia groups became visible in the country in the 1990s when the Nigerian 
state was in distress under callous military dictatorship, particularly during 
the Babagida and Abacha regimes. One of the consequences of the character 
of these regimes was the rise of militia groups.  (Adejumobi, 2002). 
 
The other dimension to the rise of militia groups under the Babangida and 
Abacha regimes was the marginalization and social deprivation, particularly 
of the ethnic minorities of the Niger Delta region.  The response of the 
government to the Niger Delta crisis has been the militarization of the region 
to keep at bay restive youth and other groups to ensure the free flow of oil to 
the Nigerian state.  This has led to the emergence of several militant youths 
while the existing non-violent groups have resorted to violence as a challenge 
to brutality occasioned by the presence of military personnels in the region. 
The objective of these militant groups is to challenge the violent posture of 
the state and highlight the marginalization and deprivation that characterized 
the Niger Delta region. 
 
The above context has led to the emergence and growth of militia groups in 
the Niger Delta region.  Between 1990 and 1999, not less than twenty-four 
ethnic based minority right groups emerged in the region with radical 
postures.  These include the Egbesu Boys of Africa (EBA), Chikoko Ijaw 
National Congress, Ijaw Youth Council (IYC), Ijaw Peace Movement (IPM), 
Isoko National Youth Movement (INYM) and the Movement for the Survival 
of Ogoni People (MOSOP). Others that emerged after 1999 include 
Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) and Niger Delta 
Peoples Volunteer Force (NDPVF). 
 
None of these groups, at their inception, had violent inclinations as their 
objectives. The prevailing circumstances forced these formations into 
violence some of which have degenerated into criminal activities.   
 
The nature and character of the Nigerian state, failure and lack of political 
leadership and political institutions, the struggle for power and unfair or 
unequal economic relations among ethnic nationalities are some of the 
factors that have prompted the emergence of ethnic militia groups in the 
Nigerian state and the Niger Delta region in particular.  The resolve is to 
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resist the deprivation, social injustice, marginalization, neglect, and seeming 
insecurity of the people through whatever means including the formation of 
underground organizations. 
 
Factors Responsible for the Emergence and Proliferation of Ethnic 
Militia 
Diverse explanations have been put forward for the growth in the number of 
ethnic militia groups in Nigeria. Babawale (2001) conceives of the 
emergence of militia groups as being due to imperfections in Nigeria’s 
federal system. He observes that the emergence is due to the manipulation of 
ethnicity by the governing elite across the various geo-political zones.  
Furthermore, these groups were formed as a consequence of mismanagement 
of ethnic grievances by the Nigerian state and were meant to be the militant 
organs of expression of defiance against oppressive rule. Danjuma (2002) 
argues that the formation and activities of ethnic militias are traceable to 
neglect by government or a perception of such neglect on the part of many 
ethnic nationalities in the Nigerian state and suggests: 
 
Neglect by government or even perceived neglect can be 
capitalized on by opposing groups to whip up ethnic 
sentiments which invariably results in communal 
conflicts.  It is this neglect or a perception of it, which has 
resulted in the creation of the Oodua Peoples Congress 
(OPC), Egbesu Boys, Bakassi Boys, Movement for the 
Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) and the Arewa 
Peoples’ Congress among others. 
 
The point must be made that the emergence and proliferation of militia 
groups can not be hinged on a single factor. However, the major factors 
responsible for the emergence and proliferation of ethnic militia groups in the 
Nigerian state can be examined under the following themes:the perception by 
the elite of the various ethnic nationalities who see the structure and 
operations of the Nigerian federal state as a failure and consequently their 
interests and ethnic aspiration have not been accommodated and properly 
taken care of as opined by Fredrick Fasheun the leader of the Oodua Peoples 
Congress (OPC). Fasheum (1999) explains that: 
 
we looked outwards to build the Nigerian state and the 
picture we got was a blurred picture. We didn’t see the 
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Nigerian State.  So we looked inward to our ethnic 
nationalities and we saw the ethnic nationalities. So we 
recoiled into our shelves so as to develop our ethnic 
nationality and provided platforms on which we can 
interact.  The military, during their subjugation of this 
country, did a lot of havoc to us.  All platforms for 
expressing social discontent were disrupted; the Nigerian 
Labour Congress was disrupted, the ASUU proscribed; 
NBA, NMA and so on and so forth. So there were no 
platform for social interaction and unity contin ued to 
elude us.  So we looked inward, like is said, into our 
ethnic nationalities and we decided that, okay, let us have 
these social platforms like the Ijaw National Congress, the 
Igbo Peoples Congress. 
 
In a similar note Fawehinmi (2000) mentioned the emergence and 
proliferation of ethnic militia group on perceived injustice, deprivation and 
marginalization of some ethnic nationalities and contended that 
 
The ethnic militant organisations arose in Nigeria because 
of perceived injustice, perceived exclusion of various 
forms, such as political injustice, ethnic marginalization 
and economic exclusion in terms of access to social 
services. 
 
He further elaborated that 
 
These organizations are products of several reasons, 
several areas of misgovernance of our country. OPC came 
into being as a result of the dastardly, illegal and immoral 
scuttling of the June 12 (1993) election. In the North, 
APC is in the limelight because the masses of the North 
are ignored by their leaders (who) are not able to improve 
the quality of life of the poor people…  In the East, the 
insecurity has been very unwholesome and this cannot be 
contested.  The police is unable to take care of lives and 
property in the East and therefore the Bakassi Boys 
emerged.  Then the Egbesu Boys situation is even more 
depressing, because they come from the Niger Delta and 
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98 percent of our resources are derived from the Niger 
Delta.  And when they cried for succour, the Federal 
Government gave them bullets… when they asked for 
education; food on the table, the Federal Government met 
them with bullets.  So the Egbesu Boys said ‘No, enough 
is enough’. 
 
Thus, it is arguable that the collapse of most institutions, inter-ethnic inequity 
has stimulated the political elite of the various ethnic nationalities to promote 
and encourage new organizations that, would promote interests of those 
ethnic nationalities. In doing this these groups have drawn strength from “the 
new global recognition of ethnic self-determination as an intergral part of the 
promotion of global human rights (Amuta, 2000). 
 
A second factor in the emergence and proliferation of ethnic militia groups is 
the collapse of the state institutions established for the protection of life and 
property, particularly the Nigerian Police Force. Fawehinmi identified the 
failure of security agencies as a major consequence for the rise of the militia 
phenomenon in Nigeria. He opined that 
 
The abysmal failure of the security agencies of 
government has contributed to the strength and social 
acceptability of the ethnic militia organizations in various 
parts of the country… The inability of the police to 
provide security has compelled the public to transfer the 
confidence that should have been reposed in the police to 
the ethnic militia who have proved, in some cases, to be 
more reliable and effective in checking the menace of 
armed robbers in local communities… Government 
should bear the responsibility for the growth and 
development of ethnic militia organizations that are 
rooted in its failure to satisfy the welfare needs of the 
masses and its failure to provide security of lives and 
property. 
 
The third factor in the emergence and proliferation ethnic militia groups can 
be seen as a symptom of what Bangura (1999) referred to as “an 
extraordinary youth crisis”.  This crisis has its offshoot in the growth and 
increase in the nation’s youth, as a consequence of the nation’s rapid 
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population growth.  This situation has been heightened by the collapse of the 
educational system, the construction of opportunities in the formal job sector 
and the relegation of most of the nation’s youth to existence in very harsh 
conditions, either from a difficult informal sector or from the nightmare of an 
overcrowded job market. Under these circumstances, increasing numbers of 
youth particularly in the nation’s major urban centres have been exposed to 
living on the streets and in a culture of marginality which is found in drugs, 
loose morality, violence, profanity and disrespect for societal values and 
norms (Bangura, 1999). 
 
A common factor in the growth and proliferation of ethnic militia groups in 
Nigeria is the increase in the number of small arms.  There is an estimated 3 
million small arms and light weapons in Nigeria and most of these arms are 
in private hands and more than 80 percent of these privately owned arms 
were acquired illegally (Vanguard, 2000). 
 
The proliferation of small arms and light weapons has not only given rise to a 
culture of violence; it has encouraged disaffected groups into mounting direct 
challenges to legitimate authorities. Obasi, N. (2002), observed that 
 
The ease with which virtually any group can obtain light 
weaponry has not only encouraged the proliferation of 
armed ethnic militia, but has also emboldened such 
groups to carry on their activities with little regard for 
state owned security and law enforcement agencies”. 
 
Evidence abound of the fact that a large proportion of small arms and light 
weapons in Nigeria in recent times end up not with the criminal gangs 
operating in many urban centers but with ethnic militia groups, in various 
parts of the country. There is also evidence of a large concentration of this in 
the Niger Delta. 
 
Ethnic Militia Groups and Criminality in the Niger Delta 
The theft and illegal trading in refined petroleum products and crude oil 
The theft and illegal trading in refined petroleum products and crude oil 
started on a small scale in the 1980’s.  It has graduated from amateurs who 
utilize crude methods in the extraction of refined petroleum products and 
crude oil from the distribution pipelines of the MNCs to advanced 
technologies to tap refined petroleum products and crude with the aid of 
African Research Review Vol. 3 (3), April, 2009. Pp. 315-330 
 
Copyright © IAARR, 2009: www.afrrevjo.com 323 
Indexed African Journals Online: www.ajol.info 
sophisticated communications equipment and transportation means across 
creeks, rivers and rivulets. 
 
It has become large and extensive in scale since the late 1990s.  Aerial 
Survey and Patrol of the creeks and waters of Rivers and Bayelsa States 
revealed a large number of boats and barges involved in illegal bunkering. 
The refined petroleum products and crude oil are transported through ships 
and barges and sold in the high sea.  The crude oil is sold at very low prices; 
when the price per barrel was 26 USD, as at 2003, it was sold for 7USD. By 
2004, it was sold at about 15USD per barrel (Oduniyi, 2003). 
 
There is also the involvement of the community and ethnic militia in the 
illegal economy, some of which control the waterways and creeks.  It is 
assumed and claimed that the illegal trading is undertaken by rival and well-
armed ethnic based militia groups. However, there was no such organized 
militia when the illegal trading began in the 1980s.  When militia became 
active in the Niger Delta in the late 1990s, they were engaged in violently 
compelled benefits from MNCS, However, when they began to be involved 
in the illegal theft and trade in refined petroleum products and crude oil, they 
were merely foot soldiers to big time bunkerers. 
 
Oil barons form militia groups to enrich them and import also weapons to 
arm themselves for the purpose of securing and defending their operations. 
Some leaders of the militia groups are now involved in illegal theft and 
illegal trading in refined petroleum products and crude oil.  Some even 
exchange refined petroleum products and crude oil for communication 
gadgets and arms for militia wars (Ikelegbe, A. 2005). 
 
The illegal oil business further underpins communal and ethnic conflicts in 
the Niger Delta region. The weapon inflow empowers the communities and 
militias for violent conflicts and other activities bordering on criminality.  
The theft and illegal trade in refined petroleum products and crude oil 
provide financial backing for its leading militia groups and armed gangs. 
 
Profitable as it may seem, it is also a known fact that a thousand persons lose 
their lives annually in bloody encounters between militias, communities and 
the armed forces (Maier, 2004).  Militia groups are involved in violent crime 
in the Niger Delta. 
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Kidnapping and Hostage Taking in the Niger Delta 
Tables 1 and 2 show cases of kidnapping and hostage-taking in the Niger- 
Delta between 2002 and 2007 for ransom.  This has been prevalent in the 
core oil producing states of Delta, Rivers and Bayelsa.  The incidence of 
kidnapping and hostage-taking began in 1990 and took a new dimension 
recently when kidnapping and hostage-taking did not only involve workers 
with MNCS but politicians.  A large number of indigenous expatriate 
workers, particularly foreign nationals and security personnels attached to 
them and MNCS have been kidnapped and taken hostage for the purpose of 
ransom.  It is evident that there are syndicates and warlords to whom some 
militia groups are loyal (Omonobi and Okhomina, 2003). 
 
The extensive regime of violence in the struggle for appropriation has not 
only been directed at the MNCs but has also involved the imposition of 
illegal levies on road users, land property developers and contractors 
handling projects (Onojowo 2001).  The earnings in form of ransom from this 
criminal activity are utilized to sustain the militia groups.  
 
Ethnic Militia Activities and Criminality in the Niger Delta   
The activities of ethnic militia groups in the Niger Delta have transformed 
from activities to counter the violence of the Nigerian state, the struggles 
against deprivation and marginalization to criminal acts. 
 
The dimension and magnitude of criminal activities caused by the activities 
of ethnic militia groups will be explored through the Dollard et al. (1939) 
frustration–aggression hypothesis. The hypothesis posits that people are 
pushed into aggressive behaviuor by drive influenced by frustration. This 
explanation can further be explained from two points in relation to activities 
of militia groups in the Niger Delta. 
 
Firstly, frustration leads to some form of aggression. This may not take place 
in all situations since the level of tolerance differs from one group to another. 
The magnitude of the perceived stumbling block is a function of frustration 
projection.  Given the relative strength of the Nigerian state in the case of the 
Niger Delta – government face-off often results into frustration displacement.  
As a consequence, therefore, the activities of militia groups are directed at 
government and other groups in the region who would ordinarily not be 
affected (Hewstone and Stroebe, 2001). 
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The major point is that aggression is a consequence of frustration.  The socio-
economic hardship and inequity in the distribution of the nation’s oil wealth, 
a large proportion which comes from the Niger Delta occasioned by 
marginalization and deprivation, is expressed in violence activities by militia 
groups in the region.  This accounts for crime related activities which include 
hostage-taking, demanding for ransom, robbery, vandalization of oil 
pipelines, illegal bunkering and attacks on military personnel’s. 
 
In other to substantiate the criminal base of activities engaged in by militia 
groups, there is the need to raise three vital issues. The first is why do militia 
activities occur and are sustained?  How is the image of this militia activities 
constructed and maintained? Third, can these activities by militia be 
classified as crime?  Crime is a function of driving philosophies underpinning 
state criminal definitions and criminal justice process.  From the moralist 
perspective, militia activities occasioning crime hinged on injustice is a non-
violation of the penal code, but from the perspective of law enforcement, it 
constitutes a legal breach that need to be checked and sanctioned. Making 
this a crime diverts the attention of the exploited from the root cause of 
inequity which is firmly institutionalized in the Niger Delta (Summer, 1990). 
The problem of environmental pollution or degradation, socio-economic 
closure, deprivation and such others are unlikely to attract the same degree of 
moral condemnation that attends militia related problems (Munae and 
McLaughlin, 2001). 
 
The major emphasis of the people of the Niger Delta is: give us our place; 
accord us the honour that befits us; let our voice count in the projects that 
affect our lives and bequeath us what is just, right and proper.  It is in the 
light of the above that the activities of militia groups should be 
contextualized. At the outset of the formation of militia groups, their 
objective was to fight against deprivation, inequity and marginalization in the 
Niger Delta. However, this has degenerated into criminal activities such as 
bunkering, vandalization of petroleum pipelines, kidnappings and hostage 
taking. 
 
Solutions to Menace of Ethnic Militia in the Niger Delta  
This paper has analysed the dynamics of ethnic militia groups and 
criminality. In investigating the most efficient way of dowsing the tension 
generated by activities of militia groups in the Niger Delta region, the paper 
suggests the adoption of the Vulnerability Reduction Strategy (VRS) 
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approach.  This approach is inherent in the combination of accommodative, 
compromise and collaborative strategies. 
 
• Accommodative strategy:  This approach involves the discontinuation of 
the current competitive approach which often generates exaggeration of 
value of granting concession on resource revenue allocation to the 
affected region, the use of talent and manifest threat built on fear of 
reprisals and the use of force, management of truth on the actual number 
of barrels of crude pumped from the Niger Delta; the accommodative 
approach that necessitate committed actions from all parties.  This will 
include invitation of stakeholders to a conference, acceptance of the 
unadulterated claims of deprivation, presentation of sincere and realistic 
demands and concessions and stoppage of self- inflicting risks.  
 
• Compromise Strategy:  This approach involves the manifestation of 
informal third party intervention void of interest that will assist in the 
transformation of conflict elements. The joint acceptable informal group 
will help dowse the existing tensions, facilitate formal roundtable 
conferences between the aggrieved groups and the implacable state. The 
informal group will attempt solutions to existing deprivations, perceived 
injustice and marginalization.  The informal group will neutralize 
elements of future conflicts. 
 
• Collaborative Strategy:  At this stage effort will be made to constitute 
formal mechanism that will be responsible for formal grievance 
handling.  This will involve the establishment of joint committees which 
will be responsible for the implementation of jointly agreed resolutions 
(Jegede & Foluke, 2007). 
 
There are major steps necessary for dowsing the crisis in the Niger Delta 
which includes:     
• provision of a conducive environment that will enhance meaningful 
negotiation; 
• Encouragement of the mutual interdependency of Nigerian state and 
the oil communities; 
• total commitment on the part of the state towards the provision of 
resources and the expansion of existing resources made available to 
the people; 
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• resource allocation must be integrative, equitable and information 
must flow unimpeded from the top to the bottom; 
• the circumventing of resources meant for the region by the elite 
group must be checked and arrested; 
• efforts must be intensified, by governments at all levels, in 
collaboration with the organized private sector and civil society 
groups to expand the opportunities and improve the quality of 
education and skill acquisition for the youth; 
• there is also the need for imaginative and far-reaching initiatives in 
the areas of job creation, poverty alleviation and the refocusing of 
youthful energy towards constructive endeavours. 
Above all, there is the need for the government to put in place security 
mechanism to curbs the menace of militia groups in the region. 
 
Conclusion 
The Nigerian government’s approach to the problem of ethnic militia is 
flawed. It has criminalized militia groups, and branded them as disgruntled 
and misguided elements or terrorist groups rather than looking at the 
underlying issues.  These groups have, more or less, conformed to these 
negative characterizations. The paper opined that fundamental issues 
bordering on social deprivation, inequity in the distribution of the Nigerian 
state’s wealth, and marginalization related to the regions minority status in 
the Nigerian federation and the situation where the dominant ethnic groups 
use the oil resources gained from the Niger Delta to develop their own areas 
need to be addressed.  The litany of hardship in the area has been well 
documented. The response of the Nigerian state to the crisis in the Niger 
Delta has been to militarize the region with the intention of keeping at bay 
restive youth and militia groups. Against the backdrop of a non responsive 
approach to the fundamental problems of activities of militia groups in Niger 
Delta, some of these groups have shifted from the objectives and orientation 
of their emergence which include agitating for equity and justice in the 
distribution of the nation’s wealth and power, deprivation and 
marginalization to criminal activities bordering on lives and properties. 
(Illegal theft and sales of refined petroleum product and crude oil, kidnapping 
and hostage-taking for ransom). 
 
In conclusion, before the issue of criminality occasioned by the Niger Delta 
can be addressed, there is the need to examine the fundamental issues 
bordering on deprivation, marginalization, inequity and security of the area. 
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Table 1: Police Records on Some Cases of Kidnapping/Hostage-taking / Sea 

















1. Kidnapping 03/03/04 Biseni, 
Bayelsa 
(BYS) 












3. Hostage – 
taking 
15/01/06 Swali, BYS 48 Militants 14 Expatriates 
& 1 Nigeria 
23/02/06 Arrest of one 
militant in 
Port Harcourt. 
4. Sea Piracy  19/02/07 Sagbama 
BYS 
9 Sea Pirates 6 Policemen 19/02/07 No source of 
livelihood  




16 victims 23/05/07 Detention of 
Alamieyeseig
ha 
6. Kidnapping 25/05/07 Akassa, 
BYS 
40 militants  9 Expatriates 
of TEXACO 
08/0607 Oil production 
without 
development 
of the area. 
7. Kidnapping 31/07/07 Amarata 
BYS 
14 Militants 11 year-old 
boy of a 
member of 
BYHA 
04/08/07 Welfare of 
militants 
8. Kidnapping 08/08/07 Gbarain, 
BYS 
11 Militants  Mother of the 
Speaker of 
BYHA 
22/08/07 Welfare of 
militants 
9. Kidnapping 18/08/07 Akassa, 
BYS 
23 Militants Mother of a 
member of 
BYHA 
07/09/07 Welfare of 
militants 
10. Kidnapping 08/10/07 Odi, BYS Commander 
Pius Group 
1 Nigeria 15/10/07 Ransom 
11. Kidnapping 15/10/07 Southern-
Ijaw BYS 
Unknown 1 Nigeria  15/10/07 Ransom  
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taking of 10 
workers/April 
2002 










failure to yield to 
alleged frivolous 
demands 
2. Kidnap of 















ated release after 
14 days. 
3. Kidnap of 9 
crew & 4 
military 




 Ijaw militants Ransom/o
ther 
demands 
Released 2 days 










































River Area / 
Delta State. 
-- -- 
Source:  Williams 2000: Agency France-Press 2003. 
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